So we all know the OSI model by heart, right?   Well, I’m offering up my model of technology management. Really at this stage I’m looking for feedback

• Layer 7: Global Layer. This layer is regulated by treaties with other nation-states or international standards.  I fit cybercrime treaties in here along with the RFCs that make the Internet work.  Problem is that security hasn’t really reached much to this level unless you want to consider multinational vendors and top-level cert coordination centers like CERT-CC.
• Layer 6: National-Level Layer. This layer is an aggregation of Federations and industries and primarily consists of Federal law and everything lumped into a “critical infrastructure” bucket.  Most US Federal laws fit into this layer.
• Layer 5: Federation/Community Layer. What I’m talking here with this layer is an industry federated or formed in some sort of community.  Think major verticals such as energy supply.  It’s not a coincidence that this layer lines up with DHS’s critical infrastructure and key resources breakdown but it can also refer to self-regulated industries such as the function of PCI-DSS or NERC.
• Layer 4: Enterprise Layer. Most security thought, products, and tools are focused on this layer and the layers below.  This is the realm of the CSO and CISO and roughly equates to a large corporation.
• Layer 3: Project Layer. Collecting disparate technologies and data into a similar piece such as the LAN/WAN, a web application project, etc.  In the Government world, this is the location for the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) or the System Security Engineer (SSE).
• Layer 2: Integration Layer. Hardware, software, and firmware combine to become products and solutions and is focused primarily on engineering.
• Layer 1: Code Layer. Down into the code that makes everything work.  This is where the application security people live.

There are tons of way to use the model.I’m thinking each layer has a set of characteristics like the following:

• Scope
• Level of centralization
• Responsiveness
• Domain expertise
• Authority
• Timeliness
• Stakeholders
• Regulatory bodies
• Many more that I haven’t thought about yet

Chocolate Layer Cake photo by foooooey.

My whole point for this model is that I’m going to try to use it to describe the levels at which a particular problem resides at and to stimulate discussion on what is the appropriate level at which to solve it.  For instance, take a technology and you can trace it up and down the stack. Say Security Event and Incident Monitoring:

• Layer 7: Global Layer. Coordination between national-level CERTs in stopping malware and hacking attacks.
• Layer 6: National-Level Layer. Attack data from Layer 5 is aggregated and correlated to respond to large incidents on the scale of Cyberwar.
• Layer 5: Federation/Community Layer. Events are filtered from Layer 4 and only the confirmed events or interest are correlated to determine trends.
• Layer 4: Enterprise Layer. Events are aggregated by a SIEM with events of interest flagged for response.
• Layer 3: Project Layer. Logs are analyzed in some manner.  This is most likely the highest in the model that we
• Layer 2: Integration Layer. Event logs have to be written to disk and stored for a period of time.
• Layer 1: Code Layer. Code has to be programmed to create event logs.

I do have an ulterior motive.  I created this model because most of our security thought, doctrine, tools, products, and solutions work at Layer 4 and below.  What we need is discussion on Layers 5 and above because when we try to create massively-scaled security solutions, we start to run into a drought of information at what to do above the Enterprise.  There are other bits of doctrine that I want to bring up, like trying to solve any problem at the lowest level for which it makes sense.  So in other words, we can use the model to propose changes to the way we manage security… say we have a problem like the lack of data on data breaches.  What we’re saying when we say that we need a Federal data breach law is that because of the scope and the amount of responsibility and competing interests at Layer 5, that we need a solution at Layer 6, but in any case we should start at the bottom and work our way up the model until we find an adequate scope and scale.

So, this is my question to you, Internet: have I just reinvented enterprise public policy, IT architecture (Federal Enterprise Architecture) and business blueprinting, or did I create some kind of derivative view of technology, security, and public policy that I can now use?

• More on the Rybolov Information Security Management Model
• Blow-By-Blow on S.773–The Cybersecurity Act of 2009–Part 4
• Massively Scaled Security Solutions for Massively Scaled IT
• In Response to “Cyber Security Coming to a Boil” Comments….
• Blow-By-Blow on S.773–The Cybersecurity Act of 2009–Part 3

OK, so there’s this article being bounced all over the place.  Basic synopsis is that FISMA is keeping the government from doing any kind of electronic health records stuff because FISMA requirements extend to health care providers and researchers when they take data from the Government.

Read one version of the story here

So the whole solution is that, well, we can’t extend FISMA to eHealthcare when the data is owned by the Government because that security management stuff gets in the way.  And this post is about why they’re wrong and right, but not in the places that they think they are.

Government agencies need to protect the data that they have by providing “adequate security”.  I’ve covered this a bazillion places already. Somewhere somehow along the lines we let the definition of adequate security mean “You have to play by our rulebook” which is complete and utter bunk.  The framework is an expedient and a level-setting experience across the government.  It’s not made to be one-size-fits-all, but is instead meant to be tailored to each individual case.

The Government Information Security Trickle-Down Effect is a name I use for FISMA/NIST Framework requirements being transferred from the Government to service providers, whether they’re in healthcare or IT or making screws that sometimes can be used on the B2 bombers.  It will hit you if you take Government data but only because you have no regulatory framework of your own with which you can demonstrate that you have “adequate security”.  In other words, if you provide a demonstrable level of data protection equal to or superior to what the Government provides, then you should reasonably be able to take the Government data, it’s finding the right “esperanto” to demonstrate your security foo.

If only there was a regulatory scheme already in place that we could use to hold the healthcare industry to.  Oh wait, there is: HIPAA.  Granted, HIPAA doesn’t really have a lot of teeth and its effects are maybe demonstrable, but it does fill most of the legal requirement to provide “adequate security”, and that’s what’s the important thing, and more importantly, what is required by FISMA.

And this is my problem with this whole string of articles:  The power vacuum has claimed eHealthcare.  Seriously, there should be somebody who is in charge of the data who can make a decision on what kinds of protections that they want for it.  In this case, there are plenty of people with different ideas on what that level of protection is so they are asking OMB for an official ruling.  If you go to OMB asking for their guidance on applying FISMA to eHealthcare records, you get what you deserve, which is a “Yes, it’s in scope, how do you think you should do this?”

So what the eHealthcare people really are looking for is a set of firm requirements from their handlers (aka OMB) on how to hold service providers accountable for the data that they are giving them.  This isn’t a binary question on whether FISMA applies to eHealthcare data (yes, it does), it’s a question of “how much is enough?” or even “what level of compensating controls do we need?”

But then again, we’re beaten down by compliance at this point.  I know I feel it from time to time.  After you’ve been beaten badly for years, all you want to do is for the batterer to tell you what you need to do so the hurting will stop.

So for the eHealthcare agencies, here is a solution for you.  In your agreements/contracts to provide data to the healthcare providers, require the following:

• Provider shall produde annual statements for HIPAA compliance
• Provider shall be certified under a security management program such as an  ISO 27001, SAS-70 Type II, or even PCI-DSS
• Provider shall report any incident resulting in a potential data breach of 500 or more records within 24 hours
• Financial penalties for data breaches based on number of records
• Provider shall allow the Government to perform risk assessments of their data protection controls

That should be enough compensating controls to provide “adequate security” for your eHealthcare data.  You can even put a line through some of these that are too draconian or high-cost.  Take that to OMB and tell them how you’re doing it and how they would like to spend the taxpayers’ money to do anything other than this.

Case Files and Medical Records photo by benuski.

• When the Feds Come Calling
• How to Not Let FISMA Become a Paperwork Exercise
• New SP 800-60 is Out, Categorize Yerselves Mo Better
• GAO’s 5 Steps to “Fix” FISMA
• More on Georgia’s FISMA Reporting

So let me give you a hypothetical job:

• You have to give up your high-paying private-sector job to be a Government employee
• You have tons of responsibility
• You have no real authority
• You have no dedicated budget
• You have no staffers
• The job has had half a dozen people filling it in the last 7 years
• The job has been open longer than it’s been staffed over the past 7 years

And yet this is what we’re asking candidates to do in order to even be a candidate for the Cybersecurity Coordinator.  Yes, this is the exact same problem that all CISOs have with having a huge helping of responsibility and none of the authority to get things done, only we scaled it up and out to a national-level CISO position.

Somebody’s even gone as far to say that the lack of candidates for the job is the security field’s way of sending the message that you didn’t scope the job right.  I think this opinion has much merit.  CISOs being what they are, they’re usually pretty astute at walking into an ambush, and this job has all the makings of a good one.

I’ll even turn it around the other way and say that the security industry has yet to produce a CISO’s CISO–somebody who can do politics, budget, security, IT, and consensus-building all in one person.  We have lots of people who can manage the enterprise and below, but it’s that additional little bit of political intrigue that is what we’re missing.  Security people usually avoid politics like the bubonic plague because we’re an industry full of people who say it like it really is.  This is a detriment in sales and politics.

So in true Guerilla-CISO fashion of not pointing out problems without offering something as a fix (no matter how much of a strawman arguement it really is), this is what we need to do to get people interested in being the Cybersecurity Czar^wCoordinator:

• A really well-defined scope.  One person cannot do everything that we are asking for at this price (or any price for that matter).
• A budget for an operating staff where the number is more than than 8 digits.
• Statutory authority over the various departments and agencies responsible for cybersecurity: NCSD, S&T, DoJ, FBI, Commerce.  Indirect influence doesn’t work here, never has.
• The direct ear of the President.  Councils are OK, but puhlease, you want to get the job done, this is what it will take.

Then I read back through my list and realized that we really do need a law to create the Cybersecurity Czar position with everything that I just mentioned.  But here’s the rub: legislation is slow, the bills to make the Cybersecurity Czar aren’t even going to be looked at until the next congressional session because we’re still trying to figure out the budget for last year.

I also think that what we’re calling the Cybersecurity Czar is really 2 jobs.  You need somebody working for the Government CIO Vivek Kundra as the executive-branch CISO and you need a more senior person who worries about the military-industrial base, the critical infrastructure, the support to American commerce, and the protection of little old grandmas who represent the end-users.

Tsar’s Cannon photo by Siyad Ma.  Now that’s some teeth for the position.

• Blow-By-Blow on S.773–The Cybersecurity Act of 2009–Part 5
• Blow-By-Blow on S.773–The Cybersecurity Act of 2009–Part 4
• Next Up in Security Legislation: S3474
• Cyber Security coming to a boil
• A Layered Model for Massively-Scaled Security Management

In the military, there is a saying: “You go to war with the army you have, not with the army you wish you had.”  In other words, you do all your training in peace and once you go off to war, it’s too late to fix it. Not that I agree with all the Cyber Pearl Harbor doomsayers, but I think that the CyberArmy we got now isn’t the right one for the job.

So, let’s talk about services firms, contractors fit into this nicely since, well, they perform services.

There are 4 types of work that services firms do (and contractors are services firms):

• Brains: nobody else has done this before, but we hire a whole bunch of PhD people who can research how to get this done.  We charge really high prices but it’s because in the downtime, our people are doing presentations, going to symposiums, and working on things that you don’t even know exist.  Think old-school L0pht.  Think half of Mitre.  Think sharks with friggin laser beams, lasing and eating everything in sight.
• Gray Hair: We’ve done this before and know most of the problems that we can experience, along with the battle scars to prove it.  We charge quite a bit because we’re good and it takes less of us to get it done than our competitors.  Think most good IT engineers.  Think DLP and DAM right now.  Think infantry platoon sergeants.
• Procedural: There is a fairly sizeable market starting to grow around this service so we have to standardize quite a bit to reduce our costs to provide the service.  We use methodologies and tools so that we can take an army of trained college graduates, put them in a project, and they can execute according to plan.  Think audit staff.  Think help desk staff.  Think of an efficient DMV.
• Commodity: There isn’t a differentiator between competitors, so companies compete on price.  The way you make money is by making your cost of production lower or selling in volume.  Think Anti-Virus software (sorry friends, it’s true).  Think security guards.  Think peanut butter.

This is also the maturity model for technology, so you can take any kind of tech, drop it in at the top, and it percolates down to the bottom.  Think Internet use: First it was the academics, then the contractors, then the technology early adopters on CompuServe, then free Internet access to all.  For most technology, it’s a 5-10 year cycle to get from the top to the bottom.  You already know this: the skills you have now will be obsolete in 5 years.

Procedural Permit Required photo by Dawn Endico.

Now looking at government contracting….

As a government contractor, you are audited financially by DCAA and they add up all your costs and let you keep a fixed margin of around 13-20%.  You can pull some Stupid Contractor Tricks ™ like paying salaries and working your people 60 hours/week (this is called uncompensated overtime), but there still is a limit to what you can do.

This fixed margin forces you into high-volume work to turn a profit.  This in turn forces you into procedural or even commodity work.

If your project is strictly time and material, you make more money off the cheaper folks but for quality of work reasons, you have to provide them with a playbook of some sort.  This pushes you directly into the procedural tier.

There are some contractors providing services at the Brains and Gray Hair stages, only they are few and far between.

Traditional types of contractor security services:

• Security Program Management and Governance
• Audit and Penetration Testing
• Compliance and Certification and Accreditation Support
• Security Operations (think Managed Security Services)

Then back around to cyberwar…

Cyberwar right now is definitely at the top of the skill hierarchy.  We don’t have an official national strategy.  We have a Cybersecurity Coordinator that hasn’t been filled yet.  We need Brains people and their skills to figure this out.  In fact, we have a leadership drought.

And yet the existing contractor skillset is based on procedural offerings.  To be honest, I see lots of people with cybersecurity offerings, but what they really have is rebranded service offerings because the skills sets of the workforce haven’t changed.

Some of the procedural offerings work, but only if you keep them in limited scope.  The security operations folks have quite a few tranferable skills, so do the pen-testers.  However, these are all at the tactical level.  The managerial skills don’t transfer really at all unless you have people that are just well-rounded, usually with some kind of IT ops background.

But, and this is the important thing, we’re not ready to hire contractors until we do get some leadership in place. And that’s why the $25M question right now is “Who will that person be?”  Until that time, anything from the vendors and contractors is just posturing.

Once we get a national leadership and direction, then it’s a matter of lining up the services being offered with the needs at the time.  What I think we’ll find out at that time is that we’re grossly underrepresented in some areas and sadly underrepresented in some areas and that these areas are directly inverse to the skills that our current workforce has.  This part scares me.

We need workforce development.  There are some problems with this, mostly because it takes so long to “grow” somebody with the skills to get the job done–maybe 5-10 years with education and experience.  Sadly, about the time we build this workforce, the problem will have slid down the scale so that procedural offerings will probably work.  This frustrates me greatly.

The summary part…

Well, just like I don’t want to belong to any club that would stoop so low to have me as a member, it could be possible that almost all the contractors offering services aren’t the people that you want to hire for the job.

But then again, we need to figure out the leadership part first.  Sadly, that’s where we need the most love.  It’s been how many months with a significant leadership vacuum?  9? 12? 7 years?

The most critical step in building a cyberwar/cyberdefense/cyberfoo capability is in building a workforce.  We’re still stuck with the “option” of building the airplane while it’s taxiing down the runway.

• Security Assessment Economics
• Engagement Economics and Security Assessments
• A Little Advice From Mike and Lee
• Inside the Obama Administration’s Cyber Security Agenda
• How to Not Let FISMA Become a Paperwork Exercise

Actually this is all a little bit strange to comprehend, I’m not sure I get it all, but here goes…

So my friend Michael Santarcangelo sold his palatial estate, put his wordly posessions in storage somewhere in upstate NY state, and packed up his family in an RV and is travelling around the US giving a series of seminars on “Communicating the Value of Security”.  I’ve met Michael, and he’s not a patchouli-smelling hippie looking for inner truth or some kind of weird traveling salesman, he’s just a really smart guy who’s passionate about what he does.

And he’s coming to Northern Virginia on the 25th to bring you BBQ, pool, and a seminar on how to communicate with non-security folks.  There’s a trivial cost to pay for the food.  It’s also a family event, and there’s no extra cost for your family to come along, although when Michael sees how much my teenage daughters eat, he’ll probably charge me at least an extra $50 bucks.

Get the full set of information here.  Sign up and give it a try.

• Privacy Camp DC on June 20th
• Certification and Accreditation Seminar, March 30th and 31st
• Metricon 5 Wrapup
• Introducing the NoVa InfoSec Portal
• C&A Seminar in August, Instructor-to-Coolness Ratio Goes Up!

Why hello there private sector folks.  It’s no big surprise, I work in the US Federal Government Space and we have some unique challenges of scale.  Glad to meet you, I hear you’ve got the same problems only not in the same kind of scale as the US Federal Government.  Sit back, read, and learn.

You see, I work in places where everything is siloed into different environments.  We have crazy zones for databases, client-facing DMZs, managment segments, and then the federal IT architecture itself: a loose federation of semi-independent enterprises that are rapidly coming together in strange ways under the wonderful initiative known as “The TIC”.  We’re also one of the most heavily audited sectors in IT.

And yet, the way we manage patch and vulnerability information is something out of the mid-80’s.

Current State of Confusion

Our current patch management information flow goes something like this:

• Department SOC/US-CERT/CISOs Office releases a vulnerability alert (IAVA, ISVM, something along those lines)
• Somebody makes a spreadsheet with the following on it:
  • Number of places with this vulnerability.
  • How many have been fixed.
  • When you’re going to have it fixed.
  • A percentage of completion
• We then manage by spreadsheets until the spreadsheets say “100%”.
• The spreadsheets are aggregated somewhere.  If we’re lucky, we have some kind of management tool that we dump our info into like eMASS.
• We wonder why we get pwned (by either haxxorz or the IG).

Now for how we manage vulnerability scan information:

• We run a tool.
• The tool spits out a .csv or worse, a .html.
• We pull up the .csv in Excel and add some columns.
• We assign dates and responsibilities to people.
• We have a weekly meeting togo over what’s been completed.
• When we finish something, we provide evidence of what we did.
• We still really don’t know how effective we were.

Problems with this approach:

• It’s too easy to game.  If I’m doing reporting, the only thing really keeping me reporting the truth is my sense of ethics.
• It’s slow as hell.  If somebody updates a spreadsheet, how does the change get echoed into the upstream spreadsheets?
• It isn’t accurate at any given moment in time, mostly because changes quicker than the process can keep up.  What this means is that we always look like liars who are trying to hide something because our spreadsheet doesn’t match up with the “facts on ground”.
• It doesn’t compare with our other management tools like Plans of Action and Milestone (POA&M).  They usually are managed in a different application than the technical parts, and this means that we need a human with a spreadsheet to act as the intermediary.

So this is my proposal to “fix” government patch and vulnerability management: Federated Patch and Vulnerability Management through SCAP.

Trade Federation Battle Droid photo by Stéfan.  Roger, Roger, SCAP means business.

Whatchu Talkin’ Bout With This “Federated” Stuff, Willis?

This is what I mean, my “Plan for BSOFH Happiness”:

Really what I want is every agency to have an “orchestrator” ala Ed Bellis’s little SCAP tool of horrors. =)  Then we federate them so that information can roll up to a top-level dashboard for the entire executive branch.

In my beautiful world, every IT asset reports into a patch management system of some sort.  Servers, workstations, laptops, all of it.  Yes, databases too.  Printers–yep.  If we can get network devices to get reported on config info via SCAP-enabled NMS, let’s get that pushing content into our orchestrator. We don’t even really  have to push patches using these tools–what I’m primarily concerned with at this point is to have the ability to pull reports.

I group all of my IT assets in my system into a bucket of some sort in the orchestrator.  That way, we know who’s responsible when something has a problem.  It also fits into our “system” concept from FISMA/C&A/Project Management/etc.

We do periodic network scanning to identify everything on our network and feed them into the orchestrator.  We do regular vulnerability scans and any findings feed into the orchestrator.  The more data, the better aggregate information we can get.

Our orchestrator correlates network scans with patch management status and gives us a ticket/alert/whatever where we have unmanaged devices.  Yes, most enterprise management tools do this today, but the more scan results I have feeding them, the better chance I have at finding all my assets.  Thanks to our crazy segmented architecture models, we have all these independent zones that break patch, vulnerability, and configuration management as the rest of the IT world performs it.  Flat is better for management, but failing that, I’ll take SCAP hierarchies of reporting.

The Department takes a National Vulnerability Database feed and pushes down to the Agencies what they used to send in an IAVA, only they also send down the check to see if your system is vulnerable.  My orchestrator automagically tests and reports back on status before I’m even awake in the morning.

I get hardening guides pushed from the Department or Agency in SCAP form, then pull an audit on my IT assets and have the differences automagically entered into my workflow and reporting.

I become a ticket monkey.  Everything is in workflow.  I can be replaced with somebody less expensive and can now focus on finding the answer to infosec nirvana.

We provide a feed upstream to our Department, the Department provides a feed to somebody (NCSD/US-CERT/OMB/Cybersecurity Coordinator) who now has the view across the entire Government.  Want to be bold, let Vivek K and the Sunlight Foundation at the data feeds and have truly open and transparent, “Unbreakable Government 2.1”.  Who needs FISMA report cards when our vulnerability data is on display?

Keys to Making Federated Patch and Vulnerability Management Work

Security policy that requires SCAP-compatible vulnerability and patch management products.  Instead of parroting back 800-53, please give me a requirement in your security policy that every patch and vulnerability management tool that we buy MUST BE SCAP-CERTIFIED.  Yes, I know we won’t get it done right now, but if we get it in policy, then it will trickle down into product choices eventually.  This is compliance I can live with, boo-yeah!

Security architecture models (FEA anyone?) that show federated patch and vulnerability management deployments as part of their standard configuration.  OK with the firewall pictures and zones of trust, I understand what you’re saying, now give me patch and vulnerability management flows across all the zones so I can do the other 85% of my job.

Network traffic from the edges of the hierarchy to…somewhere.  OK, you just need network connectivity throughout the hierarchy to aggregate and update patch and vulnerability information, this is basic data flow stuff.  US-CERT in a future incarnation could be the top-level aggregator, maybe.  Right now I would be happy building aggregation up to the Department level because that’s the level at which we’re graded.

Understanding.  Hey, I can’t fix everything all the time–what I’m doing is using automation to make the job of fixing things easier by aggregation, correlation, status reporting, and dashboarding.  These are all concepts behind good IT management, why shouldn’t we apply them to security managment also?  Yes, I’ll have times when I’m behind on something or another, but guess what, I’m behind today and you just don’t know it.  However, with near-real-time reporting, we need a culture shift away from trying to police each other up all the time to understanding that sometimes nothing is really perfect.

Patch and vulnerability information is all-in.  It has to be reporting in 100% across the board, or you don’t have anything–back to spreadsheets hell for you.  And simply put, why don’t you have everything in the patch management system already?  Come on, that’s not a good enough reason.

POA&Ms need to be more fluid.  Face it, with automated patch and vulnerability management, POA&Ms become more like trouble tickets.  But yes, that’s much awesome, smaller, easily-satisfied POA&Ms are much easier to manage provided that the administrative overhead for each of these is reduced to practically nothing… just like IT trouble tickets.

Regression testing and providing proof becomes easier because it’s all automated.  Once you fix something and it’s marked in the aggregator as completed, it gets slid into the queue for retesting, and the results become the evidence.

Interfaces with existing FISMA management tools.  This one is tough.  But we have a very well-entrenched software base geared around artifact management, POA&M management, and Security Test and Evaluation results.  This class of software exists because none of the tools vendors really understand how the Government does security management, and I mean NONE of them.  There has to be some weird unnatural data import/export acts going on here to make the orchestrator of technical data match up with the orchestrator of managment data, and this is the part that scares me in a federated world.

SCAP spreads to IT management suites.  They already have a footprint out there on everything, and odds are we’re using them for patch and configuration management anyway.  If they don’t talk SCAP, push the vendor to get it working.

Where Life Gets Surreal

Then I woke up and realized that if I provide my Department CISO with near-real-time patch and vulnerability mangement information, I suddenly have become responsible for patch and management instead of playing “kick it to the contractors” and hiding behind working groups.  It could be that if I get Federated Patch and Vulnerabilty Management off the ground, I’ve given my Department CISO the rope to hang me with.  =)

Somehow, somewhere, I’ve done most of what CAG was talking about and automated it.  I feel so… um… dirty.  Really, folks, I’m not a shill for anybody.

• NIST and SCAP; Busting a cap on intruders Part 1
• Comments on SCAP 2008
• Security Automation Developers Conference Slides
• Ed Bellis’s Little SCAP Project
• OMB Wants a Direct Report