I’ve always wondered why I have yet to meet anyone in the Government using Database Activity Monitoring (DAM) solutions, and yet the Government has some of the largest, most sensitive databases around.  I’m going to try to lay out why I think it’s a great idea for Government to court the DAM vendors.

Volume of PII: The Government owns huge databases that are usually authoritative sources.  While the private sector laments the leaks of Social Security Numbers, let’s stop and think for a minute.  There is A database inside the Social Security Administration that holds everybody’s number and is THE database where SSNs are assigned.  DAM can help here by flagging queries that retrieve large sets of data.

Targetted Privacy Information:  Remember the news reports about people looking at the presidential candidate’s passport information?  Because of the depth of PII that the Government holds about any one individual, it provides a phenomenal opportunity for invation of someone’s privacy.  DAM can help here by flagging VIPs and sending an alert anytime one of them is searched for. (DHS guys, there’s an opportunity for you to host the list under LoB)

Sensitive Information: Some Government databases come from classified sources.  If you were to look at all that information in aggregate, you could determing the classified version of events.  And then there are the classified databases themselves.  Think about Robert Hanssen attacking the Automated Case System at the FBI–a proper DAM implementation would have noticed the activity.  One interesting DAM rule here:  queries where the user is also the subject of the query.

Financial Data:  The Government moves huge amounts of money, well into $Trillions.  We’re not just talking internal purchasing controls, it’s usually programs where the Government buys something or… I dunno… “loans” $700B to the financial industry to stay solvent.  All that data is stored in databases.

HR Data:  Being one of the largest employers in the world, the Government is sitting on one of the largest repository of employee data anywhere.  That’s in a database, DAM can help.

Guys, DAM in the Government just makes sense.

Problems with the Government adopting/using DAM solutions:

DAM not in catalog of controls: I’ve mentioned this before, it’s the dual-edge nature of a catalog of controls in that it’s hard to justify any kind of security that isn’t explicitly stated in the catalog.

Newness of DAM:  If it’s new, I can’t justify it to my management and my auditors.  This will get fixed in time, let the hype cycle run itself out.

Historical DAM Customer Base:  It’s the “Look, I’m not a friggin’ bank” problem again.  DAM vendors don’t actively pursue/understand Government clients–they’re usually looking for customers needing help with SOX and PCI-DSS controls.

London is in Our Database photo by Roger Lancefield.

• Civilians Ask “What’s With All the Privacy Act Kerfluffle?”
• Transparency in Government: Just Give us the Data!
• Selling Water to People in the Desert
• Cloud Computing and the Government
• Web 2.0 and Social Media Threats for Government

Paraben is a leading vendor for digital forensics products (http://www.paraben.com/). However, within this huge international market, Paraben specializes in digital forensic products for mobile devices such as PDA and phones. Paraben just recently released a very nice product called the Cell Seizure Investigator (CSI) Stick (http://www.csistick.com/index.html).

Aside from the overly-dramatic marketing embedded in the name of the product, this seems to be another solid addition to the Paraben product line. The device is designed to make a forensically correct copy of the data on your mobile phone–including call records, address books, and text messages. The devices look basically like a USB flash memory drive with the addition of an adapter/interface unit.

The copying process is largely automatic and the CSI Stick is quite reasonably priced at $99 -199, depending on the software bundle. The market reaction to this product is also quite positive. My friends in the industry who have used the device consider it an indispensable time-saving device. I can hardly wait until I get my have on one myself. In the past when, I was tasked to recover such data it was much more time consuming and hardware intensive process.

Equally fascinating, is the release (if you can call it that) of a product with a similar form-factor from Microsoft. The product is released on a flash drive and is called COFEE (Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor — http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2008/apr08/04-28crantonqa.mspx).  Microsoft indicates that COFEE contains 150 commands that facilitate the collection of digital evidence from computers that it is physically connected to. In addition, COFEE can decrypt passwords, and collect information on a computer’s Internet activity, as well as data stored in the computer. Microsoft has indicated that COFEE has been made available to law-enforcement agencies only. And, according to one report, law-enforcement agencies in 15 nations have been provided with the device.

My initial reaction to this news was that it was not an unexpected development and that the announcement would be greeted with inevitable jokes about the need for Microsoft to also release a companion product called DONUTS. In fact, the reaction of the technical press has been largely negative and suspicious. Most of the concerns seem to center on privacy and individual rights. However, there isn’t a single capability associated with COFEE that I have been able to confirm, that doesn’t exist in some other commercial or open-source product. I do wish that I could get my hands on a trial or lender copy of COFFEE so that I could confirm this position.

Locksmith Sign photo by Meanest Indian.

While I admit that I have always been concerned about the safeguarding individual’s civil liberties, I am largely puzzled at the negative reactions. One element of the outcry that I do understand is an emotional one and that centers on the concept that a company that is paid to protect your secrets should not also be selling the tools and techniques to compromise those secrets. On an emotional level this makes sense.

However, the real world is very different. For example, every major automobile manufacturer cooperates with locksmiths to insure that there are low-cost and non-destructive means to circumvent you car locks in the event that you lock you keys in your cars or just loose you car key outright. Without getting into the details of defeating car locks, may automobile manufactures even provide specialized equipment and technical materials directly to locksmiths to facilitate this process.

If there are concerns that Microsoft my be caught in a ethical conflict of interest, we need to look at similar conflicts in other industries, and that’s food for thought.

• A Perspective on the History of Digital Forensics
• Evolution of Penetration Testing: Part 1
• Transparency in Government: Just Give us the Data!
• Inside the Obama Administration’s Cyber Security Agenda
• Database Activity Monitoring for the Government

In part 1 on this blog I outlined the fact penetration testing evolved from a grey-art practiced by hackers into a more formal process.  This evolution has created a bifurcation within “boutique” penetration test service providers.

On the one hand tools-oriented budget firms offer little value added beyond simply running simple vulnerability scans.  On the other more profession and experienced firms offer the same tests and scans but also offer analysis that can be offered as direct actionable input into an organization’s existing security governance structure. 

The fly in the ointment is that not all security consumers or security organizations are created equally.  Some IT security organizations can be characterized a compliance-based.  That is to say that they establish and follow a set of rule that they believe will put them on the road to IT security.

On the other hand, most IT security organizations are risk-based and technically oriented.  They also follow a formal structure but, addressing risk with the appropriate application of process, procedures, and technology.  In  graphical terms the situation would appear to line-up as depicted in table 1.  Table quadrant 1 representing a weak security organization supported by, “Tool-boys” is noted in red because the risks associated with this coupling.  Quadrants 2 and 3 are noted in yellow because of the risks associated with either a weak security organization or weak testing input.  

Table 1

However, in the real world the table should look more like Table 2. With the increasing acceptance of Compliance-based security models, a set of independently administered vulnerability scans suffices to “check the box” for the requirements for a penetration test.  This is good news for these budget “boutique” firms. 

Table 2

However, as might be expected, it is bad news for IT security in general since all networks live in the same security ecosystem.   Market drivers that encourage poor security practices hurt us all.

Hacker Store photo by LatinSuD.

• Evolution of Penetration Testing: Part 1
• NIST and SCAP; SCAP @ Large Part 2
• Comments on SCAP 2008
• An Open Letter to NIST About SP 800-30
• Core Belief #4 — Compliance is a Dead-End

Penetration testing is a controversial topic with an interesting history. It is made all that much more controversial and perplexing because of an common disconnect between the service provider and the consumer.

Penetration started as a grey-art that was often practiced/delivered in an unstructured and undisciplined manner by reformed or semi-reformed hackers. Penetration testers used their own techniques and either their own home-grown tools or tools borrowed or traded with close associates. There was little reproducibility or consistency of results or reporting. As a result, the services were hard to integrate into a security program.

As the art evolved it became more structure and disciplined and tools, techniques, and reporting became more standardized. This evolution was driven by papers, articles, technical notes that were both formally published and informally distributed. In the end, a standardized methodology emerged that was largely based on the disciplined approach used by the most successful hackers.

Hakker Kitteh photo by blmurch.

At about the same time open-source, government and commercial tools began to emerge that automated many of the steps of the standardized methodology. These tools had two divergent impacts on the art of penetration testing. As these tools were refined and constantly improved they reinforced the standard methodology, provided more consistent and reproducible results and improved and standardized penetration reporting. All of this made penetration testing easier for the consumer to absorb and integrate into security programs. As a result, regulations and security protocols emerged that required penetration and security assessments. Nmap and Nessus are excellent examples of the kind of tools that help shape and push this evolution. And, because of their utility they are still indispensable tools today.

However, Nessus also helped to automate both data collection and analysis, it has lowered the bar for the skills and experience needed to conduct portions of the penetration testing methodology. This lowered the cost of penetration testing and made them much more broadly available. Thus, giving rise to so-called “boutique firms.” The problem with penetration testing “boutique firms” is that they fall into two broad categories; specialized highly professional firms led by experienced and technical security professionals who can translate automated tool output into root-cause analysis of vulnerabilities, and security program flaws. The second category of firm consists of opportunist firms with just enough knowledge to run automated tools and cut and paste the tool output into client reports. The later firms are some times called “tool-firms” and their employees “tool-boys.”

The later flourish for two reasons. The first is that they can offer their services at rock bottom prices. The second reason is that security organizations are often so ill-informed of the intricacies of the penetration testing process that can’t make a meaningful distinction between the professional firms and the tool-boys except on the basis of costs.

• Evolution of Penetration Testing: Part 2
• NIST and SCAP; Busting a cap on intruders Part 1
• Comments on SCAP 2008
• The 10 CAG-egorically Wrong Ways to Introduce Standards
• 20 Critical Security Controls: Control-by-Control

I was attending a conference at NIST (the National Institute of Standards) concerning the SCAP program (Security Content Automation Protocol; pronounced ESS-cap).  SCAP is focused on providing the Federal government with automated, common,  interoperable security solutions.  Specifically the SCAP program has developed a common set of standards for reporting security vulnerabilities for use in automated security scanners, security appliances and reporting systems.

Well, why do we need SCAP?  If we use the Godfather of all vulnerability management tools, the NESSUS vulnerability scanner as an example, we have seen that industry has produced a number of similar products.  Each has its own strengths and rich feature set.  However, none of them use the same “language” for detecting or describing or reporting a potential vulnerability.  This not only means that these various products can only be used to operate with each other with some measure of difficulty but, trying to aggregate and manage the result of reports from these systems can be tedious.

“Tim Bray at XML 2005” photo by Roland.

As a result of these efforts and vision of the dedicated employees at NIST, industry is already scrambling to get their related products SCAP certified.  And, Federal agencies are also specifying in contracts that products must be SCAP certified in order to be qualified for purchase.  This is real progress and great news for the tax payer who will get real better value for their tax dollar.  But, it is not a revolution — yet.  Where I see the revolution emerging is in six-month to a year time frame when industry takes note of the SCAP program and we begin to see SCAP certified and SCAP interoperable products being ordered.  It will not be long after that that we may see the SCAP protocol used in even consumer-level products like personal firewalls.  This ability to give us all a common language will significantly reduce the cost of building and supporting vulnerability scanners and vulnerability reporting tools.  This cost reduction will allow resources to be freed up to address prevention and mitigation concerns in a more meaningful manner.

For example, industry has tools that enable network and security support professionals to detect a mis-configuration in a desktop machine in their network and correct it.  But, only the largest and most well funded security IT security departments have such tools.  With the advent of SCAP, these kind of services will be much more affordable and supportable and thus more common.  In fact, because much of this can be automated, I can even envision the McAfee, Symantec, and others who are well placed in the vulnerability scanning market to offer support services over the wire to smaller businesses and to consumers.  Moreover, as this technology improves and becomes commoditized, I can see ISP’s offering security scanning and mediation as a service to their customers.

• NIST and SCAP; SCAP @ Large Part 2
• Security Automation Developers Conference Slides
• Comments on SCAP 2008
• Save a Kitten, Write SCAP Content
• Federated Vulnerability Management

I just got back from the SCAP 2008 conference at NIST HQ, and this is a collection of my thoughts in a somewhat random order:

Presention slides are available at the NVD website

I blogged about SCAP a year ago, and started pushing it in conversations with security managers that I came across.  Really, if you’re managing security of anything and you don’t know what SCAP is, you need to get smart on it really fast, if for no other reason than that you will be pitched it by vendors sporting new certifications.

Introduction to SCAP:  SCAP is a collection of XML schemas/standards that allow technical security information to be exchanged between tools.  It consists of the following standards:

• Common Platform Enumeration (CPE): A standard to describe a specific hardware, OS, and software configuration.  Asset information, it’s fairly humdrum, but it makes the rest of SCAP possible–think target enumeration and you’re pretty close.
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): A definition of publicly-known vulnerabilities and weaknesses.  Should be familiar to most security researches and patch monkies.
• Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE): Basically, like CVE but specific to misconfigurations.
• Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS): A standard for determining the characteristics and impact of security vulnerabilities.  Hmmm, sounds suspiciously like standardization of what is a high, medium, and low criticality vulnerability.
• Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL):  Actually, 3 schemas to describe the inventory of a computer, the configuration on that computer, and a report of what vulnerabilites were found on that computer.
• Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF): A data set that describes checks for vulnerabilities, benchmarks, or misconfigurations.  Sounds like the updates to your favorite vulnerability scanning tool because it is.

Hall of Standards inside NIST HQ photo by ME!!!

What’s the big deal with SCAP: SCAP allows data exchanges between tools.  So, for example, you can take a technical policy compliance tool, load up the official Government hardening policy in XCCDF for, say, Windows 2003, run a compliance scan, export the data in OVAL, and load the results into a final application that can help your CISO keep track of all the vulnerabilities.  Basically, imagine that you’re DoD and have 1.5 million desktops–how do you manage all of the technical information on those without having tools that can import and export from each other?

And then there was the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC): OMB and Karen Evans handed SCAP its first trial-by-fire.  FDCC is a configuration standard that is to be rolled out to every Government desktop.  According to responses received by OMB from the departments in the executive branch (see, Karen, I WAS paying attention =)   ), there are roughly 3.5 Million desktops inside the Government.  The only way to manage these desktops is through automation, and SCAP is providing that.

He sings, he dances, that Tony Sager is a great guy: So he’s presented at Black Hat, now SCAP 2008 (.pdf caveat).  Basically, while the NSA has a great red-team (think pen-test) capability, they had a major change of heart and realized, like the rest of the security world (*cough*Ranum*cough*), that while attacking is fun, it isn’t very productive at defending your systems–there is much more work to be done for the defenders, and we need more clueful people doing that.

Vendors are jumping on the bandwagon with both feet: The amount of uptake from the vulnerability and policy compliance vendors is amazing.  I would give numbers of how many are certified, but I literally get a new announcement in my news reader ever week or so.  For vendors, being certified means that you can sell your product to the Government, not being certified means that you get to sit on the bench watching everybody else have all the fun.  The GSA SAIR Smart-Buy Blanket Purchase Agreement sweetens the deal immensely by having your product easily purchasable in massive quantities by the Government.

Where are the rest of the standards: Yes, FDCC is great, but where are the rest of the hardening standards in cute importable XML files, ready to be snarfed into my SCAP-compliant tool?  Truth be told, this is one problem with SCAP right now because everybody has been focusing on FDCC and hasn’t had time yet to look at the other platforms.  Key word is “yet” because it’s happening real soon now, and it’s fairly trivial to convert the already-existing DISA STIGs or CIS Benchmarks into XCCDF.  In fact, Sun was blindsided by somebody who had made some SCAP schemas for their products and they had no idea that anybody was working on it–new content gets added practically daily because of the open-source nature of SCAP.

Changing Government role: This is going to be controversial.  With NVD/CVE, the government became the authoritative source for vulnerabilities.  So far that’s worked pretty well.  With the rest of SCAP, the Government changes roles to be a provider of content and configurations.  If NIST is smart, they’ll stay out of this because they prefer to be in the R&D business and not the operations side of things.  Look for DHS to pick up the role of being a definitions provider.  Government has to be careful here because they could in some instances be competing with companies that sell SCAP-like feed services.  Not a happy spot for either side of the fence.

More information security trickle-down effect: A repeated theme at SCAP 2008 is that the public sector is interested in what Big SCAP can do for them.  The vendors are using SCAP certification as a differentiator for the time being, but expect to see SCAP for security management standards like PCI-DSS, HIPAA, and SOX–to be honest here, though, most of the vendors in this space cut their teeth on these standards, it’s just a matter of legwork to be able to export in SCAP schemas.  Woot, we all win thanks to the magic that is the Government flexing its IT budget dollars!

OS and Applications vendors: these guys are feeling the squeeze of standardization.  On one hand, the smart vendors (Oracle, Microsoft, Sun, Cisco) have people already working with DISA/NSA to help produce the configuration guides, they just have to sit back and let somebody turn the guides into SCAP content.  Some of the applications vendors still haven’t figured out that their software is about to be made obsolete in the Government market because they don’t have the knowledge base to self-certify with FDCC and later OS standards.  With a 3-year lead time required for some of the desktop applications before a feature request (make my junk work with FDCC) makes it into a product release, there had better be some cluebat work going on in the application vendor community.  Adobe, I’m talking to you and Lifecycle ES–if you need help, just call me.

But how about system integrators: Well, for the time being, system integrators have almost a free ride–they just have to deal with FDCC.  There are some of them that have some cool solutions built on the capabilities of SCAP, but for the most part I haven’t seen much movement except for people who do some R&D.  Unfortunately for system integrators, the Federal Acquisition Regulation now requires that anything you sell to the Government be configured IAW the NIST checklists program.  And just how do you think the NIST checklists program will be implemented?  I’ll take SCAP for $5Bazillion, Alex.  Smart sytem integrators will at least keep an eye on SCAP before it blindsides them 6 months from now.

Technical compliance tools are destined to be a commodity: For the longest time, the vulnerability assessment vendors made their reputation by having the best vulnerability signatures.  In order to get true compatibility across products, standardized SCAP feeds means that the pure-play security tools are going to have less things to differentiate themselves from all the other tools and they fall into a commodity market centered on the accuracy of their checks with reduced false positives and negatives.  While it may seem like a joyride for the time being (hey, we just got our ticket to sell to the Gubmint by being SCAP-certified), that will soon turn into frustration as the business model changes and the margins get smaller.  Smart vendors will figure out ways to differentiate themselves and will survive, the others will not.

Which leads me to this: Why is it that SCAP only applies to security tools?  I mean, seriously, guys like BigFix and NetIQ have crossover from technical policy compliance to network management systems–CPE in particular.  What we need is a similar effort applied to network and data center tools.  And don’t point me at SNMP, I’m talking rich data.  =)  On a positive note, expect some of the security pure-play tools to be bought up and incorporated into enterprise suites if they aren’t already.

Side notes:

I love how the many deer (well over 9000 deer on the NIST campus) all have ear tags.  It brings up all sorts of scientific studies ideas.  But apparently the deer are on birth control shots or something….

Former Potomac Forum students:  Whattayaknow, I met some of our former students who are probably reading this right now because I pimped out my blog probably too aggressively.  =)  Hi Shawn, Marc, and Bob!

Old friends:  Wow, I found some of them, too.  Hi Jess, Walid, Chris, and a cast of thousands.

Deer on NIST Gaithersburg Campus photo by Chucka_NC.

• Sir Bruce Mentions FDCC, World Goes Nuts
• Security Automation Developers Conference Slides
• Some Words From a FAR
• NIST and SCAP; Busting a cap on intruders Part 1
• Ed Bellis’s Little SCAP Project